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Bargaining in the (Murky) Shadow
of Arbitration
Jill I. Gross*
Disputing parties who are unable to settle their differences will
end up before an adjudicator (typically a judge or jury) who will
decide their dispute for them. Dispute resolution scholars have
long theorized that disputants bargain in the shadow of this ad-
judicated outcome, predicting what would happen in court sub-
stantively and procedurally, and negotiating based on an
assessment of the strength of "bargaining endowments" derived
from applicable legal norms. The increasing use of arbitration to
resolve commercial disputes in the U.S. means that more and
more disputants are negotiating in the shadow of arbitration, not
litigation. This Article explores how procedural differences be-
tween arbitration and litigation impact disputants who bargain
in arbitration's shadow, and adds an entirely new critique to the
robust scholarship criticizing the fairness of mandatory arbitra-
tion. Because arbitration awards are often not public and are not
considered precedent, the law does not develop in areas where
virtually all disputes are arbitrated. Disputants can only murk-
ily predict the likely outcome in arbitration, and thus can neither
negotiate from an anchoring premise nor manage the risk of a
failed negotiation. Ultimately, this leads to a reduction in value
of the bargaining endowments the shadow of the law would oth-
erwise grant. In turn, this weakens the legitimacy of these settle-
ments and of arbitration as a dispute resolution process.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Most civil disputes settle." When negotiating settlements, dis-
puting parties make and respond to offers, try to persuade
counterparties why demands should be met, perhaps posture and
bluff, and reach impasse or agreement. Looming in the background
and casting a shadow over all negotiations is what could happen if
the parties do not settle.
Modern negotiation theorists agree that, during a bargaining
process, 2 disputants negotiate in the shadow of the law: they identify
legal rules and procedures that govern the dispute, assess the likely
outcome a binding adjudicative process (typically a civil case in court)
would yield if the parties are unable to settle, and shape their bar-
gaining strategy based on those legal rules and procedures. 3 Negoti-
ated outcomes then reflect, in part, the parties' assessments of the
1. Modern estimates of settlement rates for civil court cases range from 60 per-
cent to 90 percent, with variations across case categories. See, e.g., Benjamin Sun-
shine & Victor Abel Pereyra, Access-to-Justice v. Efficiency: An Empirical Study of
Settlement Rates After Twombly & Iqbal, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 357, 372 (2015) (gather-
ing prior empirical studies of settlement rates and concluding that "they all agree that
the settlement rate of federal civil cases is somewhere between 60% and 70%"); Theo-
dore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What is the Settlement Rate and Why Should We
Care?, 6 J. EMPIR. L. STUD. 111, 111 (2009) (estimating aggregate settlement rate
across case categories in district courts studied to be 66.9 percent and concluding "no
reasonable estimate of settlement rates supports an aggregate rate of over 90 percent
of filed cases, despite frequent references to 90 percent or higher settlement rates").
But see The Landscape for Civil Litigation in State Courts, NATIONAL CENTER FOR
STATE COURTS, CIVIL JUSTICE INITIATIVE (2015), https://www.nesc.org/-/media/Files/
PDF/Research/CivilJusticeReport-2015.ashx (last visited Jan. 19, 2019) (reporting
only 10 percent settlement rate of cases filed in courts studied). Of course, this data
cannot take into account civil disputes that never make it to a court filing.
2. The bargaining process may be direct negotiation between parties, or media-
tion, where a third-party neutral (the mediator) assists parties in settling their dis-
pute. See Jill I. Gross, Securities Mediation: Dispute Resolution for the Individual
Investor, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISPUTE RESOL. 329, 331 (2006).
3. See Yuval Sinai & Michal Alberstein, Expanding Judicial Discretion: Be-
tween Legal and Conflict Considerations, 21 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 221, 241 (2016)
("The parties bargain 'in the shadow' of that prediction [as to the formal application of
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strength of their "bargaining endowments"-the legal rights of bar-
gaining parties that are created by legal norms that the court other-
wise would apply in their favor.4
Although, historically, most dispute negotiations took place in
the shadow of the law as applied and developed by courts, the in-
creasing use of arbitration to resolve commercial disputes means that
more and more disputants negotiate in the shadow of arbitration, not
litigation.5 If the parties do not settle the dispute, a panel of arbitra-
tors rather than a judge or a jury will impose a binding decision. In
particular, parties who are required to arbitrate disputes based on a
pre-dispute arbitration clause in an adhesive consumer, employment,
or brokerage account agreement negotiate in the shadow of
"mandatory" (sometimes called "forced") arbitration.6
Critique of the state of modern U.S. commercial arbitration-
both adhesive and non-adhesive-abounds.7 Criticism revolves
around both the courts' strict enforcement of the agreement to arbi-
trate as well as an arguably unfair arbitration process resulting from
that agreement. Because arbitration awards typically are neither
public nor precedential, one school of thought has expressed alarm
over the privatization and lack of public development of (or "freezing"
of) the law for decades.8 Critical arbitration theorists argue that a
law] and their 'private ordering' is a market of rulemaking in which new sub-rules
and arrangements constitute the law in action."); CARRIE J. MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL.,
DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BEYOND THE ADVERSARIAL MODEL 322 (2d ed. 2011). For an
analysis of how the shadow of arbitration impacts negotiators in practice, see Jill I.
Gross, Negotiating in the Shadow ofAdhesive Arbitration, in THE NEGoTIATOR's DESK
REFERENCE (Chris Honeyman & Andrea Kupfer Schneider eds., 2017) [hereinafter
Gross, Negotiating in the Shadow of Adhesive Arbitration].
4. See generally Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the
Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979) [hereinafter
Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law].
5. See infra Section III.
6. In this context, "mandatory" arbitration is defined as arbitration resulting
from a predispute arbitration clause in an adhesive agreement between parties of
unequal bargaining power.
7. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Arbitration Fairness Index: Using a Public
Rating System to Skirt the Legal Logjam and Promote Fairer and More Effective Arbi-
tration of Employment and Consumer Disputes, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 985, 988-91 (2012)
(identifying fairness concerns surrounding the growth of mandatory arbitration
clauses); Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stack-
ing the Deck of Justice, N.Y. THiEs (Nov. 1, 2015) (first in a series of three articles
attacking arbitration).
8. See, e.g., Myriam Gilles, The Day Doctrine Died: Private Arbitration and the
End of Law, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 371, 376-77 (2016) (arguing that, because arbitra-
tion awards lack "[t]he stuff of the common law-stare decisis, publicity, and preclu-
sion principles, . . . common law doctrinal development will cease" for many types of
cases); Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive Law, 124
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system of mandatory arbitration, which has resulted from the Su-
preme Court's improper preference for binding arbitration over litiga-
tion,9 delegates to private parties the power to alter substantive
rights,1 0 forces parties to prospectively waive substantive rights,"
suppresses valid claims of parties with little to no bargaining
power,12 and strips parties of rights-including the right to pursue
claims as class or collective actions.1 3 Some of these same scholars
YALE L.J. 3052, 3057 (2015) ("Through the procedural device of private arbitration,
private parties have the quasi-lawmaking power to write substantive law largely off
the books by precluding or severely impeding the assertion of various civil claims.");
Kathryn A. Sabbeth & David C. Vladeck, Contracting (Out) Rights, 36 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 803, 807 (2009) (warning that "[tlo the extent that we are considering wholesale
acceptance of arbitration as a mandatory substitute for litigation, we must come to
terms with the fact that we are sacrificing the public interpretation of public laws");
Stephen Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbi-
tration, 83 MiNN. L. REV. 703, 704 (1999) (considering "the extent to which the crea-
tion of law has been privatized through arbitration" and suggesting that "under
Supreme Court cases and other current legal doctrine, vast areas of law are privatiz-
able and that this degree of privatization is possible only through arbitration"); Bar-
bara Black & Jill I. Gross, Making It Up As They Go Along: The Role of Law in
Securities Arbitration, 23 CARDOzo L. REV. 991, 1013-26 (2002) (expressing concern
over freezing of law governing broker-dealers' obligations to customers).
9. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, The Privatization of Process: Requiem for and Cele-
bration of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure at 75, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1793, 1809-14
(2014) (contending that Supreme Court decisions in arbitration "regularly rely on the
Court's view that arbitration is to be preferred to adjudication"); see generally Jean R.
Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference for
Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637 (1996).
10. See generally, e.g., David Horton, Arbitration as Delegation, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV.
437 (2011); see also Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Su-
preme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial,
Separation of Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TuL. L. REV. 1, 13 n.38 (1997).
11. See, e.g., David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business:
Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wis.
L. REV. 33, 110-21 (1997).
12. See, e.g., Cynthia Estlund, The Black Hole of Mandatory Arbitration, 96 N.C.
L. REV. 679, 684 (2018) (citing "mounting evidence that effectively enables employers
to nullify employee rights and to insulate themselves from the liabilities that back up
crucial public policies"); Jean R. Sternlight, Disarming Employees: How American
Employers are Using Mandatory Arbitration to Deprive Workers of Legal Protection,
80 BROOK. L. REV. 1309, 1310 (2015) (critiquing employers' use of mandatory arbitra-
tion to decrease employees' access to justice); Alexander J.S. Colvin, Mandatory Arbi-
tration and Inequality of Justice in Employment, 35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 71,
90 (2014) ("[Rlather than enhancing equality, mandatory arbitration exacerbates ine-
quality in access to justice in the workplace."); Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 704 (2012);
David S. Schwartz, Claim-Suppressing Arbitration: The New Rules, 87 IND. L.J. 239,
240 (2012).
13. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration Clauses Prevent
Consumers from Presenting Procedurally Difficult Claims, 42 Sw. L. REV. 87, 87-88
(2012); Nancy A. Welsh & Stephen J. Ware, Ross et al. v. American Express et al.: The
[Vol. 24:185188
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repeatedly argue that arbitration is not appropriate for public dis-
putes, and is even unconstitutional.- 4 Empirical studies have yielded
the critique that the repeat-player advantage garnered by parties
with superior bargaining power harms those with weaker bargaining
power.1 5 Finally, scholars examining arbitration procedures contend
that today's arbitration process has become too litigation-like, elimi-
nating the advantages of arbitration as a speedy and economical al-
ternative dispute resolution process.1 6
This Article adds an entirely new critique to the mounting con-
cerns over mandatory arbitration in the United States.17 If the law is
indeed underdeveloped, or even frozen in industries where virtually
all account agreements include an arbitration clause (such as securi-
ties and app-based ride-sharing), parties trying to settle disputes
arising out of those account agreements are negotiating in the
shadow of murky legal norms and a "black hole" of arbitration
outcomes. In turn, this reduces the power of any legal rights that a
Story Behind the Spread of Class Action-Barring Arbitration Clauses in Credit Card
Agreements, 21 DisP. RESOL. MAG. 18, 18-19 (2014) (detailing case in which court
found concerted actions, including twenty-eight group meetings of issuer banks across
the credit card industry, to include PDAAs in customer agreements to suppress con-
sumers' ability to bring class action suits against the industry).
14. See Deborah R. Hensler & Damira Khatam, Re-Inventing Arbitration: How
Expanding the Scope of Arbitration is Re-Shaping its Form and Blurring the Line
Between Private and Public Adjudication, 18 NEV. L.J. 381, 381 (2018) (arguing that
"re-inventing arbitration to adhere to public justice norms risks undermining its
value for private actors with private disputes, while at the same time undermining
courts as institutions for public contest over public policy issues"); Judith Resnik, Dif-
fusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and
the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2804 (2015) (arguing that the "cumulative
impact of recent Supreme Court decisions on arbitration also produces an unconstitu-
tional system, providing insufficient oversight of the processes it has mandated as a
substitute for adjudication").
15. See Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN.
L. REV. 1631, 1650-51 (2005) ("Whereas a given company will tend to arbitrate many
consumer disputes, a given consumer or employee will typically arbitrate, at most,
one. Thus, the companies have far greater experience with and exposure to the arbi-
tration process than do the consumers or employees. There is some limited empirical
evidence that the repeat player does somewhat better in arbitration than the
nonrepeat player."); Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player
Effect, 1 EMP. RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 189, 190-91 (1997).
16. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The "New Litigation," 2010 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1, 12-19 (2010) (describing changes in the nature of arbitration that made the
process more like litigation).
17. International arbitration is typically not subject to the same critiques, as
most European countries prohibit arbitration clauses in contracts of adhesion. See
Amy J. Schmitz, American Exceptionalism in Consumer Arbitration, 10 Lov. U. CHI.
INT'L L. REV. 81, 83 (2012) (reporting that "other nations do not extend strict enforce-
ment of pre-dispute arbitration clauses to [business to consumer] or employment
agreements").
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disputant otherwise could leverage in negotiation. If parties' legal
rights are reduced when negotiating in arbitration's shadow, what
impact does that have on disputants' perceptions of arbitration as a
dispute resolution process?
This Article proceeds in five parts. Section II explores the origi-
nal theory and subsequent literature on bargaining in the shadow of
the law, highlighting its focus on litigation as the alternative to set-
tling. Section III briefly summarizes the Supreme Court's jurispru-
dence regarding the enforceability of arbitration agreements, which
led to an explosion in the use of commercial arbitration in the U.S. in
the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Section IV consid-
ers how process differences between litigation and arbitration impact
dispute negotiators in the respective forums. Section V argues that at
least two of these differences-the privacy of arbitration awards and
the absence of precedent-result in uncertainty for parties who nego-
tiate in arbitration's shadow. Ultimately, this uncertainty leads par-
ties to settle a dispute for an amount that does not fully reflect the
value of bargaining endowments the shadow of the law would other-
wise grant. Section VI concludes that this discounting of bargaining
endowments weakens both the legitimacy of these settlements and
the legitimacy of arbitration as a dispute resolution process.
II. BARGAINING IN THE SHADOW OF THE LAW
Decades ago, dispute resolution scholars theorized about the im-
pact of legal principles on the negotiation process. In 1976, Melvin
Eisenberg explained that the "normative model of dispute-negotia-
tion posits that principles, rules, and precedents" play a prominent
role in negotiating disputes, even if against a party's self-interest, re-
sulting in norm-centered settlements.1 8 Professor Eisenberg further
posited:
Dispute-negotiation has a graduated and accommodative char-
acter: In reaching and rationalizing outcomes, any given norm
or any given factual proposition can be taken into account ac-
cording to the degree of its authoritativeness and applicability
(in the case of a norm) or probability (in the case of a factual
proposition). In contrast, traditional adjudication tends to have
a binary character: In reaching, and even more clearly in ratio-
nalizing outcomes, any given proposition of fact is normally
found to be either true or false, colliding norms are generally
18. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute-
Settlement and Rulemaking, 89 HARv. L. REv. 637, 649-50 (1976).
[Vol. 24:185190
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treated as if only the more compelling norm were applicable,
conflicting norms are generally treated as if only the dominant
norm were applicable, and each disputant is generally deter-
mined to be either "right" or "wrong."19
Thus, disputants might resort to a dispute-negotiation if they
want legal norms to play some role in the outcome, rather than an
absolute role. Professor Eisenberg's insights reflect an early attempt
to conceptualize negotiation as part of an interactive dynamic be-
tween formal legal systems and private institutions. 2 0
Three years later, Robert Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser ap-
plied Professor Eisenberg's theories to divorce settlements. 2 1 Profes-
sors Mnookin and Kornhauser argued that parties who negotiate the
terms of a divorce in the shadow of matrimonial law rather than pur-
sue their respective rights in the courtroom engage in a form of "pri-
vate ordering." 2 2 Mnookin and Kornhauser argued that private
ordering is desirable in the context of divorce settlements to minimize
the financial cost and emotional pain of divorce litigation, 2 3 and iden-
tified five factors that are "important influences or determinants of
the outcomes of bargaining for a divorce." 24
Notably, one critical element for parties to factor into their nego-
tiation strategy is "the bargaining endowments created by legal rules
that indicate the particular allocation a court will impose if the par-
ties fail to reach agreement." 2 5 In the context of negotiating child cus-
tody and financial terms, Mnookin and Kornhauser explained that
"the outcome that the law will impose if no agreement is reached
gives each parent certain bargaining chips-an endowment of
sorts." 2 6 These bargaining chips, or endowments, can also be thought
19. Id. at 654.
20. Id. at 637-38 ("The purpose of this Article is to explore the operation of one of
these private institutions, negotiation, and to develop the extent to which elements
characteristically associated with distinctively legal processes-principles, rules,
precedents, and reasoned elaboration-may be expected to determine outcomes
reached through that institution.").
21. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law, supra
note 4, at 950.
22. Id. at 950. As distinguished from the legal rules imposed on the parties by a
court's judgment of divorce, "private ordering is 'law' that parties bring into existence
by agreement." Id. at 950 n.1.
23. Id. at 956-58.
24. Id. at 966.
25. Id. at 968. The other four factors are "the preferences of the divorcing par-
ents"; "the degree of uncertainty concerning the legal outcome if the parties go to
court, which is linked to the parties' attitudes towards risk"; "transaction costs and
the parties' respective abilities to bear them"; and "strategic behavior." Id. at 966.
26. Id. at 968.
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of as substantive and procedural legal rights that a party voluntarily
waives or chooses not to pursue by settling a dispute. 2 7
In essence, parties who attempt to leverage as much value as
possible from those legal rights by arguing to counterparties that
those underlying norms will favor the party asserting it in an adjudi-
cative phase are engaging in what is now known as a strategy of prin-
ciples-based negotiating. To extract more value from a settlement,
parties justify via procedural and substantive norms their settlement
demands that the counter-negotiator increase the value of the offer.2 8
Indeed, the notion that dispute negotiators should incorporate princi-
ples-based bargaining as part of their strategy is a well-accepted ca-
non of modern negotiation theory. 2 9
Mnookin and Kornhauser's article spawned a vast array of schol-
arship applying and extending the theme that negotiators engage in
private ordering and proceed in the shadow of norms developed dur-
ing courtroom processes.3 0 However, this "shadow of the law" prog-
eny thus far has focused on bargaining endowments generated by
courts of law, not by other adjudicative processes.3 1 The next Section
27. See Ellen A. Waldman, Identifying the Role of Social Norms in Mediation: A
Multiple Model Approach, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 703, 741-42 (1997) (conceptualizing bar-
gaining endowments from legal norms in mediation as entitlements or rights to be
asserted by parties).
28. See ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREE-
MENT WiHouT GIVING IN 10 (1983).
29. See Hal Abramson, Fashioning an Effective Negotiation Style: Choosing Be-
tween Good Practices, Tactics, and Tricks, in THE NEGOTIATOR'S DESK REFERENCE
60-61 (Chris Honeyman & Andrea Kupfer Schneider eds., 2017).
30. See, e.g., Noa Ben-Asher, In the Shadow of A Myth: Bargaining for Same-Sex
Divorce, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 1345, 1349 (2017) (arguing that bargaining in the shadow of
a myth of egalitarianism may cause adverse effects in same-sex divorces); Grant
Strother, Resolving Cultural Property Disputes in the Shadow of the Law, 19 HARv.
NEGOT. L. REV. 335, 339 (2014) (exploring how legal rules governing certain cultural
property disputes impact negotiations); Andrea K. Schneider, Bargaining in the
Shadow of (International) Law: What the Normalization of Adjudication in Interna-
tional Governance Regimes Means for Dispute Resolution, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
789, 818-19 (2009) (analyzing the impact of international law on design of dispute
resolution processes in international systems); Christopher A. Whytock, Litigation,
Arbitration and the Transnational Shadow of the Law, 18 DuKE J. CoMP & INT'L L.
449, 450 (2008) (discussing the influence of courts on transnational arbitration);
Stewart Macaulay, Klein and the Contradictions of Corporations Law, 2 BERKELEY
Bus. L.J. 119, 130-31 (2005) (discussing how negotiators of corporate law dispute bar-
gain in the shadow of the law); Glenn Cohen, Negotiating Death: ADR and End of Life
Decision-Making, 9 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 253, 260 (2004) (discussing the "shadow of
the law" in context of disputes over end-of-life decisions); Daniel Q. Posin, Mediating
International Business Disputes, 9 FoRDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 449, 464 (2004) (dis-
cussing the impact of shadow of law on mediation of international business disputes).
31. One exception is Professor Fuller's seminal article (published posthumously
in the same year as the Mnookin/Kornhauser article but based on his earlier writings)
[Vol. 24:185192
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of the Article explores what principles-based bargaining means when
it takes place in the shadow of arbitration, and starts with a brief
history of the law enforcing arbitration agreements.
III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
Arbitration, a binding dispute resolution process in which parties
consent to submit their dispute to a third-party neutral who hears
from all parties and imposes a binding decision, or award, on the dis-
putants, 32 has been used to resolve commercial disputes in the
United States since the country's founding.3 3 Arbitration is generally
considered a faster and cheaper form of dispute resolution than liti-
gation,3 4 as it uses streamlined procedures to reach an outcome based
in which he included in his theories on the "permissible forms and the proper limits of
adjudication" a consideration of arbitrators as adjudicators. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms
and Limits ofAdjudication, 92 HAv. L. REV. 353, 355, 407 (1978) (recognizing that, if
an arbitrator is the adjudicator, "the substance of the negotiations can scarcely escape
being influenced by the parties' conceptions of what a resort to arbitration would
probably produce" and that "[e]xpectations as to the way in which an arbitrator would
view the case affect the relative bargaining power of the parties, and hence the out-
come of the negotiations"). While recognizing that disputants negotiate in the shadow
of arbitration, Professor Fuller did not explore further what that means in light of the
procedural differences between arbitration and litigation. In addition, the writings on
which this essay was based predate by decades the rise of modern commercial arbitra-
tion in the U.S. and the Supreme Court's endorsement of the use of mandatory arbi-
tration arising out of adhesive contracts.
32. See Imre Stephen Szalai, OUTSOURCING JUSTICE: THE RISE OF MODERN ARBI-
TRATION LAws IN AMERICA 7 (2013); Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Arbitration Penum-
bra: Arbitration Law and the Rapidly Changing Landscape of Dispute Resolution, 8
NEV. L.J. 427, 435-36 (2007).
33. For a comprehensive history on the use of arbitration to resolve commercial
disputes in England and the U.S., see Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice:
Community and Coercion Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931,
973-74 (1999) [hereinafter Stone, Rustic Justice].
34. Though the empirical evidence is not conclusive, and arbitration parties to-
day incur substantial costs in the proceeding, including the costs of limited discovery,
experts, motion practice, travel, filing fees, and payments to neutrals, most studies
confirm that, on average, arbitration is still less expensive to pursue to an award than
litigation. See Stephen J. Ware, Is Adjudication A Public Good? "Overcrowded Courts"
and the Private Sector Alternative ofArbitration, 14 CARDozo J. CONFLICT RESOL. 899,
907 n.31 (2013) (stating that "[t]he evidence indicates that arbitration tends to have
lower process costs than litigation" and that "[alrbitration's process costs may be so
much lower than litigation's as to more than make up for arbitration's higher adjudi-
cator costs"); Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, An Empirical Study of
AAA Consumer Arbitrations, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 843, 850 (2010). But see
Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Forum Accessibility: Empirical Evi-
dence, 41 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 813, 815-16 (2008) (concluding that arbitration may
be as costly or even more costly than litigation for certain types of disputes, and less
costly for other types); see also Lisa A. Nagele-Piazza, Unaffordable Justice: The High
Cost of Mandatory Employment Arbitration for the Average Worker, 23 U. MIAMI Bus.
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on principles of law, equity, custom, and practices unique to a partic-
ular industry.3 5 Arbitration derives from the parties' consent to trade
the formal process of court-based adjudication for a process promising
efficiency and equity.3 6
However, nineteenth and early twentieth century American
judges were hostile to arbitration and followed the English practice of
treating pre-dispute arbitration agreements (PDAAs) as revocable,
refusing to enforce them.3 7 This made it difficult for one party to a
contract to arbitrate a dispute arising out of a PDAA.3 8
Increased court congestion in the early twentieth century and
the growing popularity of arbitration as a cheaper and faster means
of resolving disputes arising out of commercial transactions led
merchants to lobby for an arbitration statute.3 9 In 1925, Congress
enacted the U.S. Arbitration Act, commonly known as the Federal
Arbitration Act,4 0 to reverse the judicial hostility towards arbitra-
tion.4 1 The FAA's key substantive provision, Section 2, declares that
a written agreement to arbitrate existing or future disputes arising
out of a "maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce" is "valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon
L. REV. 39, 42 (2014) (arguing that costs of employment arbitration for workers pre-
vent workers from vindicating their statutory rights).
35. See Jill I. Gross, Justice Scalia's Hat Trick and the Supreme Court's Flawed
Understanding of Twenty-First Century Arbitration, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 111, 116-17
(2015) [hereinafter Gross, Justice Scalia's Hat Trick].
36. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 628 (1985) ("By agreeing to arbitrate ... , [a party] trades the procedures and
opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition
of arbitration.").
37. This "revocability doctrine," which declared PDAAs unenforceable and inva-
lid, stemmed from two grounds. First, courts viewed arbitrators as improperly ousting
courts of their jurisdiction. Second, courts were reluctant to compel parties to partici-
pate in a process they could not ensure to be fair and equitable. See Stone, Rustic
Justice, supra note 33, at 975-76.
38. Id. at 973-74 ("[A] party seeking to arbitrate had no effective remedy against
a party who refused to abide by an arbitration agreement.").
39. Id. at 979. The drafters of the 1920 New York Arbitration Act (Arbitration
Law, 1920 N.Y. Laws 803 (codified as amended at N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7501-14 (McKinney
2017)), the first arbitration statute in the country, intended it to reverse the common
law revocability doctrine. Id. at 979-82.
40. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. Congress modeled the FAA on New York's arbitration
law.
41. See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006); see
also Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985) (explaining that
Congress passed the FAA "to ensure judicial enforcement of privately made agree-
ments to arbitrate"). For a thorough exploration of the legislative history and reasons
for passage of the FAA, see generally IMRE STEPHEN SZALAI, OUTSOURCING JUSTICE:
THE RISE OF MODERN ARBITRATION LAws IN AMERICA (2013).
[Vol. 24:185194
The (Murky) Shadow of Arbitration
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract." 42 By declaring pre-dispute arbitration agreements as en-
forceable as any other kind of contract, Section 2 eliminated lower
courts' ability to refuse to compel a party reluctant to arbitrate to
proceed in arbitration. 4 3
Since the 1980s, the Supreme Court has interpreted Section 2
expansively, holding that the FAA reflects both "an emphatic federal
policy in favor of arbitral dispute resolution" (the process)," and a
"liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements" (the contract
to use the process). 4 5 The Court has held that: (1) lower courts must
apply a presumption of arbitrability when deciding challenges to an
arbitration agreement; 46 (2) the FAA applies in state and federal
court to arbitration clauses in all agreements "involving commerce";4 7
42. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1947). Section 2 provides, in full:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing
a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to per-
form the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to
arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transac-
tion, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
Id. Although courts may not invalidate arbitration agreements under state laws ap-
plicable only to arbitration agreements, the last clause of Section 2, known as the
"saving clause," permits general contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or uncon-
scionability, to invalidate arbitration agreements. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concep-
cion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011).
43. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270-71 (1995) (not-
ing that Congress passed the FAA to place arbitration agreements upon the same
footing as other contracts).
44. Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 565 U.S. 530, 533 (2012) (quoting
KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, 132 S. Ct. 23, 25 (2011) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); see also Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (declaring that
the FAA reflects a "national policy favoring arbitration").
45. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983);
see also CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 669 (2012) (citing Moses H.
Cone, 460 U.S. at 24); Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stan. Junior Univ.,
489 U.S. 468, 476 (1989); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987); Gross, Justice
Scalia's Hat Trick, supra note 355.
46. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24-25 (Blackmun, J., concurring). "Arbitrability"
refers to whether a particular dispute can, as a legal matter, be resolved through
arbitration.
47. By its terms, the FAA governs agreements to arbitrate "transaction[s] involv-
ing commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). The Supreme Court has interpreted this phrase
broadly to include any transaction that in fact involves interstate commerce, even if
the parties did not anticipate an interstate impact. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v.
Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273-74, 281 (1995). Section 1 of the FAA excludes from the
Act's coverage "contracts of employment of . .. any . . . class of workers engaged in
foreign or interstate commerce," and this includes independent contractors as well as
employees. New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 539-44 (2019).
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(3) the FAA preempts conflicting state law;4 8 (4) federal statutory
claims are arbitrable as a matter of public policy unless Congress ex-
plicitly states they are not;4 9 and (5) parties are free to delegate to
the arbitrators the question of arbitrability.5 0 These Supreme Court
decisions have had the cumulative effect of eliminating virtually all
defenses to arbitrability5 1 and converting PDAAs into "super
contracts."52
With such strong court support for the enforceability of arbitra-
tion agreements, parties to private commercial transactions included
arbitration clauses in their contracts with increasing frequency in the
late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.53 In particular, pre-
dispute arbitration clauses now appear with some regularity in
48. See generally AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011). Under
the FAA preemption doctrine, the FAA preempts any state law that "actually conflicts
with federal law-that is, to the extent that it 'stands as an obstacle to the accom-
plishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.'" Volt Info.
Scis., 489 U.S. at 477 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)); see also
Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 683 (1996) (preempting a Montana
statute requiring specific type of notice in contract containing arbitration clause); Al-
lied-Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. at 272-73 (preempting Alabama statute invalidating
PDAAs in consumer contracts); Perry, 482 U.S. at 488-89 (preempting California stat-
ute requiring wage collection actions to be resolved in court).
49. See CompuCredit Corp., 565 U.S. at 100-01 (declaring federal statutory
rights to be arbitrable absent a "contrary congressional command").
50. See Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 524, 528
(2019) ("When the parties' contract delegates the arbitrability question to an arbitra-
tor, the courts must respect the parties' decision as embodied in the contract."); see
generally Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (2010).
51. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013) (noting that
arbitration agreements are enforceable even if they strip a party's ability to vindicate
its federal statutory rights, as long as they do not take away the right of a party to
bring a claim).
52. Gross, Justice Scalia's Hat Trick, supra note 35. See Richard Frankel, The
Arbitration Clause as Super Contract, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 531, 533 (2014); Thomas J.
Stipanowich, Arbitration: The "New Litigation," 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 9 (2010) ("In
the twentieth century, pre-dispute (or 'executory') arbitration agreements evolved
from disfavored status to judicially denominated 'super-clauses.'").
53. See Jeff Sovern et. al., "Whimsy Little Contracts" with Unexpected Conse-
quences: An Empirical Analysis of Consumer Understanding of Arbitration Agree-
ments, 75 MD. L. REV. 1, 11 (2015) (stating that "[tihe business community has
responded to the Supreme Court's expansive arbitration jurisprudence by adding ar-
bitration clauses to many common consumer contracts" and gathering empirical stud-
ies); Theodore Eisenberg et. al., Arbitration's Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study
of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MIcH. J. L.
REFORM 871 (2008) (reporting on prevalence of arbitration clauses in consumer as
compared to nonconsumer contracts).
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consumer, franchise, employment, and financial services contracts. 5 4
For example, one recent study found that fifty-five percent of private
sector, nonunion workers are now subject to a mandatory arbitration
provision in their employment agreements.5 5 Virtually all broker-
dealers require their customers to arbitrate disputes arising out of
their investment accounts.5 6 And all major ride-sharing apps in the
U.S. now include a PDAA in their agreements with both drivers and
passengers.57
These agreements typically are non-negotiable, take-it-or-leave-
it clauses in a broader contract of adhesion governing the relation-
ship between an individual and an institution with far greater legal
resources and bargaining power. These PDAAs might also include a
class action waiver, pursuant to which individuals waive their right
to pursue any claims collectively with others similarly situated.5 8
Many PDAA signatories are not even aware that they waived their
right to pursue claims in court.5 9
To resolve disputes that arise in this context of binding pre-dis-
pute arbitration clauses, parties negotiate in the shadow of arbitra-
tion, not court proceedings. And no doubt most of these disputes
54. See Arbitration Study: Report to Congress, pursuant to Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1028(a), Section 2, CONSUMER FINAN-
CIAL PROTECTION BUREAU (2015), http://files.consumerfiance.gov/f/201503_cfpb-arbi
tration-study-report-to-congress-2015.pdf (reporting on frequency of PDAAs in con-
sumer financial services industry).
55. See Alexander Colvin, The Growing Use of Mandatory Arbitration, ECoNoMIC
POLICY INSTITUTE (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.epi.org/publication/the-growing-use-of-
mandatory-arbitration-access-to-the-courts-is-now-barred-for-more-than-60-million-
american-workers/; see also Imre Szalai, The Widespread Use of Workplace Arbitra-
tion Among America's Top 100 Companies, THsE EMPLOYEE RIGHTs ADVOCACY INSTI-
TUTE FOR LAW AND PoLIcY, http://employeerightsadvocacy.org/publications/wide
spread-use-of-workplace-arbitration/ (reporting the results of a study that found that
"80 of the top 100 largest companies in America, including subsidiaries or related
affiliates, have used arbitration agreements in connection with workplace-related dis-
putes since 2010").
56. See Jill I. Gross, The Customer's Non-Waivable Right to Choose Arbitration in
the Securities Industry, 10 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 383, 384 (2016) (reporting
that virtually all broker-dealers include an arbitration provision in their customer
agreement).
57. See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
58. See Colvin, supra note 55 (finding that 41 percent of surveyed arbitration
clauses surveyed included a class action waiver); Szalai, supra note 55 (finding that
39 out of 80 companies used arbitration clauses that included a class action waiver).
59. See Jeff Sovern et al., "Whimsy Little Contracts" with Unexpected Conse-
quences: An Empirical Analysis of Consumer Understanding of Arbitration Agree-
ments, 75 MD. L. REV. 1, 55 (2015) (reporting that 91 percent of consumers surveyed
did not know there was an arbitration clause in their contract that prevented them
from bringing their claims in court).
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never see the inside of an arbitration hearing room. In fact, settle-
ment rates for cases filed in arbitration are reasonably similar to
those for litigation.6 0 The next Section considers how differences be-
tween the litigation and arbitration process might impact these
negotiations.
IV. IMPACT OF PROCESS OF ARBITRATION ON DISPUTE NEGOTIATORS
Though the process can vary slightly from forum to forum, most
commercial arbitrations share common procedural characteristics. 6 1
To initiate a case, a claimant need not adhere to strict pleading re-
quirements. Rather, a short and simple statement of the basis for
relief and the remedies requested is sufficient. 62 Pre-hearing proce-
dures are more limited in arbitration than in court, as most procedu-
ral rules restrict the scope of discovery and dispositive motions that
can be filed.6 3 Because many fora allow parties to agree on altera-
tions of any forum rule, arbitration procedures are more flexible.64 If
parties can select subject-matter experts as their neutrals, expert dis-
covery and expert witnesses are less necessary.6 5 Commercial arbi-
trators follow the rules of evidence only loosely at the hearing. 66 In
most settings, commercial arbitration awards, which often do not
60. See AAA Arbitration: Faster, More Cost Effective than Litigation, AMERICAN
ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, https-//www.adr.org/sites/default/files/docuiment-reposito
ry/AAA189 ArbitrationMyths.pdf (last visited Jan. 13, 2019) (reporting that 66 per-
cent of arbitration filings across five different industries settle before a hearing);
Thomas J. Stipanowich & Zachary P. Ulrich, Commercial Arbitration and Settlement:
Empirical Insights into the Roles Arbitrators Play, 6 Y.B. ON ARB. & MED. 1, 17 (2014)
(reporting that roughly 25 percent of surveyed commercial arbitrators stated that
more than half of their cases settled before a formal hearing). At the Financial Indus-
try Regulatory Authority (FINRA) Office of Dispute Resolution, which administers
virtually all securities industry arbitrations, approximately two-thirds of filed cases
settle. See FINRA Dispute Resolution Statistics, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/arbitra
tion-and-mediation/dispute-resolution-statistics#arbitrationstats (last visited May
30, 2019).
61. Most pre-dispute arbitration agreements designate a particular arbitration
forum, such as the AAA, JAMS, or FINRA, all of which have well-developed Codes of
Procedure, to administer the case. AAA rules cited in this Article refer to the AAA
Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures (as of May 2018) ("AAA
Rules"). FINRA Rules referenced in this Article are from the FINRA Code of Arbitra-
tion Procedure for Customer Disputes ("FINRA Customer Code").
62. See, e.g., AAA Rule 4(e); FINRA Customer Code 12302.
63. See, e.g., AAA Rule 33; FINRA Customer Code 12504.
64. See, e.g., AAA Rule 1(a) ("The parties, by written agreement, may vary the
procedures set forth in these rules.") At FINRA, parties may alter any deadline by
agreement. See FINRA Rule 12207.
65. See AAA Rule 13 (providing for direct appointment of an arbitrator by the
parties).
66. See FINRA Rule 12604.
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contain reasons and may not be publicly available,6 7 are not consid-
ered precedent.6 8 Finally, the grounds to appeal from an arbitration
award are strictly limited by the FAA.6 9
Some of these procedural differences between litigation and most
forms of arbitration impact the bargaining strategy of negotiators
who attempt to settle a dispute in arbitration's shadow. First, unlike
public court proceedings, arbitration is private and somewhat confi-
dential.7 0 An institution or individual concerned about its public im-
age or reputation has less at stake in arbitration than in court, as
details underlying the dispute as well as any outcome are likely to be
treated confidentially. Proceeding to arbitration does not risk the
same level of adverse publicity as in court, thus reducing the incen-
tive to settle, relative to the same case going to court.7 1 Therefore, in
situations where a dispute will proceed to arbitration absent a settle-
ment, a disputing party cannot leverage the power of adverse public-
ity for the opposing party when negotiating. The loss of that power
reduces the value of the settlement for that party.
Relatedly, a party negotiating in the shadow of litigation has to
manage the risk of setting an unfavorable precedent, particularly for
67. Most commercial fora do not publish or release their awards publicly. FINRA
Dispute Resolution is one exception; it publishes all awards on its website on a
searchable database. See Arbitration Awards Online, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/
arbitration-and-mediation/arbitration-awards (last visited May 30, 2019).
68. See Barbara Black & Jill Gross, The Explained Award of Danocles: Protec-
tion or Perl in Securities Arbitration, 34 SEC. REG. L.J. 17, 21 (2006).
69. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)-(4); see also Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 569
U.S. 564, 568 (2013) ("Under the FAA, courts may vacate an arbitrator's decision 'only
in very unusual circumstances.'") (quoting First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514
U.S. 938, 942 (1995)). As the Supreme Court has noted, narrow judicial review is
consistent with the federal policy favoring arbitration, as it "'maintain[s] arbitration's
essential virtue of resolving disputes straightaway.' If parties could take 'full-bore
legal and evidentiary appeals,' arbitration would become 'merely a prelude to a more
cumbersome and time-consuming judicial review process.'" Oxford Health Plans, 569
U.S. at 568-69 (citing Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 588
(2008)).
70. Arbitrators as well as arbitration forum staff have an ethical obligation to
keep arbitration proceedings confidential under the Code of Ethics for Commercial
Arbitrators, but parties and their lawyers have no such obligation, absent a confiden-
tiality stipulation among the parties or order from the panel. See Steven C. Bennett,
Confidentiality Issues in Arbitration, 68 Disp. RESOL. J. 1, 1 (2013) ("Arbitration pro-
ceedings are, paradoxically, both typically private and not necessarily confidential.")
71. See Gross, Negotiating in the Shadow ofAdhesive Arbitration, supra note 3,
at 705.
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a high-dollar-value claim. 7 2 For example, a pharmaceutical manufac-
turer might settle a products liability lawsuit with one individual al-
legedly harmed by side effects of a drug rather than risk having a
court set a precedent that would expand liability of the company to
plaintiffs in such suits in the future. Because arbitration awards are
not considered precedent, that risk does not exist in commercial arbi-
tration. When developing a negotiation approach, parties can no
longer leverage the power derived from the opposing party's strong
interest in avoiding setting an adverse precedent.
In addition, arbitrators do not have to follow the law strictly in
reaching awards.73 Rather, as long as they do not manifestly disre-
gard the law, they can base their decision on custom and practice in
an industry or on principles of equity, or even a combination of law
and equity. 7 4 Moreover, if the law is not clear and facially applicable
to a dispute, then the arbitrators can ignore it.76 As a result, arbitra-
tors are widely perceived to "split the baby," i.e., achieve a more equi-
table, compromised outcome, even if strict application of legal
principles would dictate a different outcome.76 Arbitrators might feel
72. See Kent D. Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 76 VA. L. REV. 1113, 1161 (1990)
(discussing how the risk of setting adverse precedent influences negotiators).
73. Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Making It Up As They Go Along: The Role of
Law in Securities Arbitration, 23 CARDozo L. REV. 991, 997, 1047 (2002) (concluding
that "arbitrators-limited in their ability to understand and apply the law-are
trained to grant paramount consideration to questions of fairness and equity").
74. Gross, Scalia's Hat Trick, supra note 35, at 117 (arguing that arbitrators
"reach an outcome based on principles of law, equity, and custom and practices
unique to a particular industry").
75. Some federal circuits interpret Section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act as
permitting a losing party to move to vacate an award for manifest disregard of the
law. Most circuits that permit this standard apply a two-prong test for manifest disre-
gard, which has both a subjective and objective component: (1) the arbitrators knew
"about 'the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decided to ignore it or
pay no attention to it,"' and (2) the law ignored by the arbitrators was "well-defined,
explicit, and clearly applicable" to the case. Schwartz v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 665 F.3d
444, 452 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal citations omitted); see also Whitehead v. Pullman
Grp., LLC, 811 F.3d 116, 121 (3d Cir. 2016); More Light Invs. v. Morgan Stanley DW,
Inc., 415 Fed. Appx. 1, 22 (9th Cir. 2011); LaPrade v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc., 246
F.3d 702, 706 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The Supreme Court has left open the question whether
manifest disregard of the law is a valid ground for vacatur. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v.
AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 672 n.3 (2010).
76. See Gross, Negotiating in the Shadow of Adhesive Arbitration, supra note 3,
at 705-06; but see Alexander Colvin & Kelly Pike, Beyond Baby-Splitting: Arbitrator
Decision-Making Patterns in Employment Cases, 68 DiSP. RESOL. J. 57, 57 (2013)
(studying employment arbitration outcomes and finding little evidence that arbitra-
tors "split the baby"); see generally Christopher R. Drahozal, Busting Arbitration
Myths, 56 KAN. L. REV. 663 (2008) (claiming to discredit the myth that arbitrators
split the baby); Stephanie E. Keer & Richard W. Naimark, Arbitrators Do Not "Split
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sympathy, even subconsciously, for the weaker party. 7 The per-
ceived risk that arbitrators might base their award on non-legal con-
siderations makes it far more difficult for a negotiator to predict with
any degree of certainty the likely outcome if the dispute proceeds to a
hearing and award.7 8
Finally, because parties have very limited grounds on which to
appeal an award, awards are more final than jury verdicts and thus
adverse awards are more consequential to the losing party. The risk
of not settling for both parties is higher than for a litigation claim,
which, in turn, encourages settlement in the shadow of arbitration
without consideration of the strength of bargaining endowments. Dis-
putants with a strong interest in managing risk-regardless of
whether they have weaker or stronger bargaining power as compared
to the counterparty-will be forced to settle on terms less advanta-
geous than a party who is less risk-averse. These procedural differ-
ences between litigation and arbitration affect negotiators regardless
of whether the dispute is "B2B" or "B2C" ("business to business" or
"business to consumer"), and shape negotiated outcomes of any type
of commercial arbitration in the U.S.
V. NEGOTIATING IN ARBITRATION'S MURKY SHADOW
In addition to process differences between litigation and arbitra-
tion, a critical substantive difference affects disputants who are nego-
tiating in the shadow of some types of arbitration. In industries
where arbitration has become the dominant forum for dispute resolu-
tion and very few disputes have made their way through the courts in
recent decades, the public law is underdeveloped and possibly even
the Baby": Empirical Evidence from International Business Arbitrations, 18 J. INT'L
ARB. 573, 574 (2001).
77. See Gross, Negotiating in the Shadow of Adhesive Arbitration, supra note 3,
at 706.
78. Of course, juries are also unpredictable. See Dru Stevenson, The Function of
Uncertainty Within Jury Systems, 19 GEO. MASON L. REv. 513, 513 (2012) (arguing
that "current jury selection methods all but guarantee that jury trial outcomes are
uncertain and unpredictable" and exploring impact of that uncertainty). Moreover,
typically litigants cannot inquire into a jury's deliberative process just as losing dis-
putants cannot inquire into arbitrators' deliberations. See Tanner v. United States,
483 U.S. 107, 117-18 (1987) (discussing history of and policies underlying common
law prohibition on admission of juror testimony to impeach a jury verdict). However,
unlike arbitrators, juries are instructed on legal issues by a court of law, and those
jury instructions are public and can be challenged by a losing litigant. See FED. R. CIV.
P. 51(d). Additionally, jury verdicts can be challenged for inconsistency, insufficiency
of evidence, or any other grounds relating to the merits. See FED. R. Civ. P. 59.
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frozen.79 Disputants trying to determine what the current law is in a
particular area might try to comb through the few arbitration awards
that are publicly available, and analyze any hints to what legal
norms arbitrators applied. In other words, the shadow of substantive
outcomes in arbitration is a dark, murky shadow-unknown, hard to
ascertain, and unpredictable.8 0 As Professor Edwards writes,
Industry-wide adoption of pre-dispute arbitration agreements
now plunges entire fields of law into shadow. As arbitrators re-
solve these disputes in the shadow of the law, the public loses
sight of critical information and arbitrators gradually lose sight
of the law.8 1
Some ADR scholars have argued that this "shadow law" as ap-
plied through ADR processes "result[s] in both the obscuring and dis-
torting of law," and, in fact, signals the "end of law." 82
Being able to assess the risks of pursuing an adjudicatory pro-
cess is crucial for disputants who are negotiating settlements of their
disputes.83 Unable to predict and thus manage the downside risk of
79. See generally, e.g., James P. Nehf, The Impact of Mandatory Arbitration on
the Common Law Regulation of Standard Terms in Consumer Contracts, 85 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1692 (2017) (exploring impact of prevalence of mandatory arbitration
in consumer context on the freezing of the common law of unconscionability and good
faith and in the dearth of authority interpreting and applying consumer statutes);
Myriam Gilles, The Day Doctrine Died: Private Arbitration and the End of Law, 2016
U. ILL. L. REV. 371 (2016); Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of
Substantive Law, 124 YALE L.J. 3052 (2015); see also Kathryn A. Sabbeth & David C.
Vladeck, Contracting (Out) Rights, 36 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 803, 806-07 (2009); Bar-
bara Black & Jill I. Gross, Making It Up As They Go Along: The Role of Law in Securi-
ties Arbitration, 23 CARDozo L. REV. 991, 1013-26 (2002).
80. See Benjamin P. Edwards, Arbitration's Dark Shadow, 18 NEV. L.J. 427, 427
(2018) ("Today, arbitration casts a long, dark shadow that obscures information that
otherwise would available.").
81. Id. at 430.
82. Rex R. Perschbacher & Debra Lyn Bassett, The End of Law, 84 B.U. L. REV.
1, 31-32 (2004) ("[P]articularly with the rise in arbitration, the balance is tipping
away from open judicial resolution of disputes-and is tipping instead toward the
creation of private processes law [in which] non-judicial decision-makers are applying
a spectrum of legal norms, ranging from near law (or shadow law) to private law (as in
arbitration) to non-law (such as reaching a resolution contrary to existing legal rules)
83. See Michaela Keet, Informed Decision-Making in Judicial Mediation and the
Assessment of Litigation Risk, 33 Omo ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 65, 68-73 (2018) (dis-
cussing basics of litigation risk assessment by negotiators); Michaela Keet, Litigation
Risk Assessment: A Tool to Enhance Negotiation, 19 CARDOzo J. CONLIcT RESOL. 17,
17 (2017) ("Without clear projections about where the path of litigation is most likely
to lead, clients can be anchored in unrealistic expectations about the outcome and the
costs of getting there.").
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arbitration, negotiators will be more willing to settle a claim in arbi-
tration as opposed to that same claim in court.8 4
Below are two illustrations of the problem of negotiating in the
shadow of unpredictable law. The first considers the impact of
mandatory securities arbitration on the development of the "suitabil-
ity rule," and the second considers the liability to passengers of rela-
tively young ride-sharing apps companies (e.g., Lyft, Uber, and Via).
Each illustrates that both bargaining parties-the individual inves-
tor and the broker, the ride-sharing passenger and the TNC-enter a
negotiation with less power to enforce legal rules that would other-
wise have inured to their benefit in court.
A. The Suitability Rule
One of the most fundamental duties broker-dealers and their em-
ployees (collectively, "brokers") owe to their customers is the duty not
to recommend unsuitable securities or investment strategies.8 5 Se-
curities regulators have long required that brokers recommend secur-
ities transactions to their customers only if those recommendations
are consistent with the customer's investment objectives, risk toler-
ance, and financial condition. 8 6 Where the doctrine applies, it in ef-
fect shifts the responsibility for making inappropriate investment
decisions from the customer to the broker.8 7 The suitability doctrine,
84. Notably, Professors Mnookin and Kornhauser also explored the effect of un-
certain legal rules on bargaining. Through the example of the amorphous and unpre-
dictable "best interests of the child" standard for custody decisions, the authors
illustrated that "the relatively more risk-averse party is comparatively disadvan-
taged." Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law, supra note 4,
at 978 ("Under the best interests principle the outcome in court will often be uncer-
tain: each spouse may be able to make a plausible claim for custody, and it may be
impossible to predict how a court would decide a disputed case."). In addition, they
posited that unpredictable rules may impose additional transaction costs on negotia-
tors and advantage a more able negotiator. Id. at 979-80.
85. See James A. Fanto et al., BROKER-DEALER LAw AND REGULATION § 16.01
(Wolters Kluwer 5th ed. 2018).
86. See Robert Mundheim, Professional Responsibilities of Broker-Dealers: The
Suitability Doctrine, 1965 DUKE L.J. 445, 448 (1965) [hereinafter Mundheim, Profes-
sional Responsibilities]; see generally Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, Suita-
bility in Securities Transactions, 54 Bus. LAw. 1557 (1999).
87. See Mundheim, Professional Responsibilities, supra note 86, at 449; see also
Erdos v. SEC, 742 F.2d 507, 508 (9th Cir. 1984); In the Matter of Venters, 51 S.E.C.
292, 1993 WL 44649, n.8 (1993) ("[T]he issue is not whether or not the client considers
the transactions in her account suitable, but whether the salesman, when he under-
takes to counsel the client, fulfills the obligation he assumes to make only such recom-
mendations as would be consistent with the client's financial situation and needs
... ."); Philips & Co. and Gerald G. Bernheimer, 37 S.E.C. 66, 70 (1956).
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originally a purely ethical standard of conduct, has evolved into a le-
gal rule, the violation of which can give rise to disciplinary action by
the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA),8" or civil lia-
bility to customers.8 9
Rule 2111 of FINRA, formerly NASD Rule 2310 (the "Suitability
Rule"),9 0 codifies the duty of broker-dealers to make only suitable rec-
ommendations of securities transactions to customers.9 1 The Suita-
bility Rule provides:
(a) A member or an associated person must have a reasonable
basis to believe that a recommended transaction or investment
strategy involving a security or securities is suitable for the cus-
tomer, based on the information obtained through the reasona-
ble diligence of the member or associated person to ascertain the
customer's investment profile. A customer's investment profile
includes, but is not limited to, the customer's age, other invest-
ments, financial situation and needs, tax status, investment
objectives, investment experience, investment time horizon, li-
quidity needs, risk tolerance, and any other information the cus-
tomer may disclose to the member or associated person in
connection with such recommendation. 9 2
FINRA divides the suitability requirement into three categories:
(1) "reasonable basis" suitability, which requires a broker to have a
reasonable basis for believing that a recommendation is suitable for
at least some investors; (2) "customer specific" suitability, which re-
quires a broker to have a reasonable basis to believe that a recom-
mendation is suitable for the particular customer to whom it is
recommended, based on that customer's investment profile; and (3)
"quantitative" suitability, or "churning," which requires a broker who
has control of an account to have a reasonable basis to believe that a
88. FINRA, formerly known as the National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD), is the most prominent self-regulatory organization (SRO) in the securities
industry.
89. See generally Norman S. Poser, Civil Liability for Unsuitable Recommenda-
tions, 19 REv. SEC. & Comm. REG. 67 (1986).
90. FINTRA adopted Rule 2111 in January 2011, to be effective July 2012.
91. Rule 2111 codifies interpretations of NASD 2310 and also adds new criteria
and requirements. Numerous FINRA Regulatory Notices about Rule 2111 provide ad-
ditional guidance to members. FINRA consolidated the guidance from critical Regula-
tory Notices into a "Frequently Asked Questions" webpage. See FINRA Rule 2111
(2014) (Suitability) FAQ, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/industry/faq-finra-rule-2111-
suitability-faq [hereinafter FINRA Suitability FAQ].
92. FINRA Rule 2111 (2014). Rule 2111.01 states in part that "[tihe suitability
rule is fundamental to fair dealing and is intended to promote ethical sales practices
and high standards of professional conduct." Id.
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series of transactions is not excessive for a particular customer in
light of the customer's investment profile. 93
Customers can seek to impose liability on brokers for unsuitable
recommendations by alleging a variety of causes of action, including
breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, breach of contract, fraudulent or
negligent misrepresentation, constructive fraud, a violation of a state
securities act, and securities fraud under section 10(b) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934.94 However, since FINRA adopted a new
version of the suitability rule, Rule 2111, the courts have had virtu-
ally no opportunity to interpret this rule because virtually all cus-
tomer complaints that a broker violated the rule and is civilly liable
to a customer as a result are heard in FINRA arbitration.9 5 In fact,
since July 11, 2012, when Rule 2111 became effective, only four deci-
sions by a court have been published that interpret the substance of
Rule 2111 in the context of a broker's liability to a customer.9 6 Ap-
proximately twenty more involve a broker's duty to make suitable
recommendations and whether civil liability results from a violation
of that duty but do not explicitly reference Rule 2111.97 In contrast,
in a much shorter time frame (January 1, 2016 to December 31,
2018), FINRA arbitrators have issued about 650 awards in cases
where a customer alleged a suitability violation, and approximately
10 percent of those involved an explained decision.9 8 None of these
93. FINRA Suitability FAQ, supra note 91.
94. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). See J. Fanto et al., BROKER-DEALER LAw & REGULATION
§ 16.04 (5th ed. 2018).
95. FINRA administrative law judges have issued at least nineteen opinions in-
terpreting Rule 2111 since it was adopted, but none of those opinions apply directly to
the issue of whether a customer can sue a broker-dealer for damages based on an
alleged unsuitable recommendation that violates Rule 2111 (list of decisions on file
with author). The author located one SEC No-Action Letter on the subject of Rule
2111. See NYLIFE Secs., LLC, 2015 WL 1148379 (S.E.C. No-Action Letter Mar. 12,
2015).
96. See generally Fernandez v. UBS AG, No. 15-CV-2859 (SHS), at *3-*5
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2018); Milliner v. Mut. Sec., Inc., No. 15-CV-03354-TEH, 2017 WL
1064978 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2017), vacated in part on reconsideration, No. 15-CV-
03354-TEH, 2017 WL 3453340, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2017); Fulton Bank v. Nat-
City Investments, Inc., No. CV 09-4855, 2017 WL 277670, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 19,
2017); Peters v. Smith, No. E058163, 2015 WL 4776126, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 13,
2015) (non-citable in Calif. Courts).
97. A January 6, 2019 search of Westlaw's "Allstates" and "Allfeds" databases
yielded 129 court opinions from this query: advanced: (unsuitability unsuitabl!
suitabil! suitable) & DA(aft 01-01-2016) & (FINRA or NASD). Of those 129 results,
fewer than twenty of those cases included a substantive legal decision on a broker's
suitability duty (analysis on file with author).
98. This information was provided in reports to the author from the Securities
Arbitration Commentator, which maintains a database of all FINRA awards. A list of
these awards are from Nov. 27, 2018 and Feb. 3, 2019, and are on file with the author.
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awards, including those with an explanation,9 9 constitute precedent.
A far larger number of suitability claims have settled either by direct
negotiation or mediation. 0 0
As a result, a customer negotiating the settlement of a dispute
involving an allegation that the broker recommended unsuitable se-
curities transactions or investment strategies cannot look to well-rea-
soned decisions interpreting Rule 2111 or imposing tort liability on a
broker for breach of the duty to recommend only suitable transac-
tions or strategies. It would be very hard to predict how that claim
would fare if it proceeded to arbitration, with little precedent to con-
sult, analyze, or argue to an arbitration panel. Thus, trying to settle a
suitability claim in the uncertain and unpredictable backdrop of
FINRA arbitration adds a murkiness to arbitration's shadow that
makes it very difficult to determine the likely outcome. Investors con-
cerned they might recover nothing at a hearing might be forced to
settle at a lower amount than they might get if they knew the likeli-
hood of prevailing in arbitration under similar facts and circum-
stances. Likewise, brokers might agree to pay a larger settlement
than they otherwise would if they knew the limits of their liability.
Both parties end up ceding the full value of their legal rights, as the
bargaining endowments that the legal rules otherwise would grant to
parties are non-existent.
The next subsection explores the second example of a scenario in
which a disputant is negotiating in the murky shadow of arbitration.
B. Ride-Sharing Apps / Transportation Network Companies
Uber Technologies, Inc. (Uber), founded in 2008 and known as a
"transportation network company" (TNC), develops, markets, and op-
erates the Uber app to allow individuals with smartphones to submit
a transportation request.1 0 1 The Uber app then sends the request to
one of Uber's subsidiaries, also known as "third-party Transportation
99. Under FINRA's Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes, an ex-
plained decision is a "fact-based award stating the general reason(s) for the arbitra-
tors' decision. Inclusion of legal authorities and damage calculations is not required."
FINRA Rule 12904(g). FINRA arbitrators are not required to issue an explained deci-
sion absent a joint request by the parties at least twenty days in advance of the first
scheduled hearing session. FINRA Rule 12514(d).
100. FINRA Dispute Resolution, Dispute Resolution Statistics, FINRA, https://
www.finra.org/arbitration-and-mediation/dispute-resolution-statistics#arbitration
stats (reporting that 67 percent of cases filed settled by negotiation or mediation) (last
visited Jan. 31, 2019).
101. See Company Overview of Uber Technologies, Inc., BLOOMBERG, http://www
.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapid=144524848 (last vis-
ited Jan. 1, 2019).
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Companies," which, in turn, forwards the request to the Uber driver
nearest to the requester, alerting the driver to the location of the cus-
tomer.10 2 The driver can then accept the request and pick up the
rider. The Uber app automatically calculates the fare, charges the
rider's credit card pre-linked to the account, and transfers payment to
the driver. 103 Other TNCs operating in the United States include
Juno, Lyft, and Via.10 4
The emergence of this app-based variation on the traditional taxi
service raises novel legal issues. For example, because the three par-
ties are all connected via the TNC app, are their legal relationships
different from other transportation services? Alternatively, are they
just inconsequential variations on the taxi service? Are Uber drivers
employees of Uber or independent contractors? Are drivers protected
under various employment statutes like the Fair Labor Standards
Act? Is the TNC liable for tortious conduct of its drivers? Can a pas-
senger invoke the theory of respondeat superior if courts find that
drivers are not employees of the TNC?
Scholars only recently have begun to explore these issues in the
TNC context.10 5 Moreover, because Uber and virtually all of its com-
petitors have pre-dispute arbitration clauses in their customer and
driver agreements,1 0 6 as well as delegation clauses delegating to the
102. See Razak v. Uber Techs., Inc., CV 16-573, 2016 WL 5874822, at *1 (E.D. Pa.
Oct. 7, 2016).
103. Id.
104. See Katrina M. Wyman, Taxi Regulation in the Age of Uber, 20 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIs. & PuB. POL'Y 1, 42 (2017).
105. See, e.g., Agnieszka A. McPeak, Regulating Ridesharing Platforms Through
Tort Law, 39 U. HAW. L. REV. 357, 360 (2017) (acknowledging that "unique liability
concerns" arise from ridesharing platforms and concluding that existing tort law can
handle those concerns); Richard A. Balesa & Christian Patrick Woo, The Uber Million
Dollar Question: Are Uber Drivers Employees or Independent Contractors, 68 MERCER
L. REV. 461, 463 (2017) (analyzing whether Uber drivers are employees or indepen-
dent contractors and determining that this question must be answered case-by-case
based on a series of tests); Miriam A. Cherry, Are Uber and Transportation Network
Companies the Future of Transportation, 4 TEx. A&M L. REV. 173, 177 (2017) (ex-
plaining the emergence of TNCs and addressing how they are changing transporta-
tion and employment law disputes); Agnieszka A. McPeak, Sharing Tort Liability In
The New Sharing Economy, 49 CoNN. L. REV. 171 (2016) (exploring ways in which
existing principles of vicarious liability can be applied in the ride-sharing context);
Alexi Pfeffer-Gillett, When "Disruption" Collides with Accountability: Holding
Ridesharing Companies Liable for Acts of Their Drivers, 104 CAL. L. REV. 233, 238-39
(2016) (offering novel approach to impose liability on TNCs for acts of their drivers).
106. See Juno Services and Juno Site Terms of Service, JUNo, https://www.juno
.com/legal/terms.html (last updated Aug. 13, 2018); Lyft Terms of Service, LYrr,
https://www.lyft.com/terms (last updated Feb. 6, 2018); Uber Terms of Use, UBER,
https://www.uber.com/legal/terms/us/ (eff. Dec. 13, 2017); Via Terms of Use, VIA,
https://ridewithvia.com/terms-of-use/ (last updated Aug. 13, 2018). Uber added a class
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arbitrator the authority to resolve disputes about arbitrability, 107
very few courts have had the opportunity to address these legal is-
sues.1 0 8 Though Uber has been sued more than any "sharing econ-
omy" company, 109 most of those lawsuits ended up in arbitration as
lower court after lower court rejected challenges to the enforceability
of Uber's arbitration clause and appellate courts upheld these
decisions. 11 0 Instead, courts enforced the arbitration clause under the
action waiver to its arbitration clause after the United States Supreme Court in Am.
Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013), enforced a class action waiver in
an arbitration clause and rejected the contention that such a waiver precluded cus-
tomers from vindicating their federal statutory rights. See Jill I. Gross, The Uberiza-
tion of Arbitration Clauses, 9 Y.B. ON ARB. & MED. 43, 51-52 (2017) [hereinafter
Uberization].
107. See David Horton, Arbitration About Arbitration, 70 STAN. L. REv. 363, 365
(2018) (exploring enforceability of delegation clauses, including Uber's, as arbi-
trability disputes).
108. See, e.g., Razak v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. CV 16-573, 2018 WL 1744467, at *1
(E.D. Pa. Apr. 11, 2018) (finding UberBLACK drivers are not employees of Uber
within the meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act and similar Pennsylvania labor
laws and asserting that this case is first to grant summary judgment on that issue)
(appeal filed); Lawson v. Grubhub, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 3d 1071, 1072 (N.D. Cal. 2018)
(finding that a Grubhub delivery driver was an independent contractor, not an em-
ployee) (appeal filed); O'Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1135 (N.D.
Cal. 2015) (declining to grant summary judgment on the issue of whether Uber driv-
ers are employees or independent contractors, finding a mixed issue of law and fact as
to the level of control Uber has over drivers). Cf Daniel Wiessner, U.S. Judge Says
Uber Drivers Are Not Company's Employees, REUTERS (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www
.reuters.com/article/us-uber-lawsuitu-s-judge-says-uber-drivers-are-not-companys-
employees-idUSKBN1HJ31I (recognizing that Razak court decided independent con-
tractor issue as one of first impression ten years after company was founded).
109. Within only a few years of its launch, in 2012, Uber drivers filed the first of
several class action lawsuits against the company. See O'Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc.,
No. C-13-3826 EMC, 2014 WL 1760314, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2014) (citing Ehret v.
Uber Techs., Inc., 14-cv-0113-EMC (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2015), a class action originally
filed by Uber drivers in 2012 in Illinois state court, which was dismissed and re-filed
in federal district court, and which similarly alleged that Uber misrepresented to rid-
ers the amount of gratuity it paid its drivers). Later driver and passenger class ac-
tions against Uber have alleged (1) misrepresentations and omissions regarding
safety measures, background checks, and other efforts it takes to provide safety for its
customers; (2) antitrust violations in the form of a price-fixing conspiracy through its
pricing algorithms; (3) overcharging or charging fictitious fees; (4) classification of
drivers as independent contractors rather than employees in violation of applicable
labor laws; (5) wrongfully depriving drivers of gratuities or other types of compensa-
tion; and (6) improperly using background checks in its hiring and firing decisions.
See Gross, Uberization, supra note 106, at 45-46; see also Chris O'Brien, Uber Has
Reportedly Been Sued at Least 433 Times in 2017, VENTUREBEAT (Aug. 23, 2017, 11:32
AM) https://venturebeat.com/2017/08/23/uber-has-reportedly-been-sued-at-least-433-
times-in-2017/.
110. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 904 F.3d 1087, 1094 (9th Cir. 2018)
(reversing a denial of a motion to compel arbitration and reversing class certification
order in class action alleging Uber improperly classified its employees as independent
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Supreme Court's FAA jurisprudence."1 ' Only a few plaintiffs who
had opted out of the clause were able to pursue lawsuits against
Uber.112
Thus, critical legal issues that are new to the TNC context will
not work their way through the courts as novel legal issues tradition-
ally do.' 13 Most of the claims will be heard in the confidential setting
of arbitration, with very few, if any, explained awards. In addition,
arbitration awards are not considered precedent, as noted above.
Even if a few courts decide some of these novel legal issues due to opt-
out plaintiffs or other plaintiffs not subject to the arbitration clause,
those legal issues will develop only sporadically through lower and
appellate courts.
contractors under applicable labor laws); Meyer v. Uber Techs., Inc., 868 F.3d 66, 80
(2d Cir. 2017) (finding that an arbitration agreement was enforceable against passen-
gers but remanding to district court to determine whether defendants waived their
right to arbitrate); Mohamed v. Uber Techs., Inc., 848 F.3d 1201, 1209 (9th Cir. 2016)
(enforcing the delegation clause in an Uber driver agreement, which delegated arbi-
trability questions to the arbitrator for all claims except challenges to the class, collec-
tive, and representative action waivers); see generally Mumin v. Uber Technologies,
Inc. 239 F.Supp.3d 507 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (granting a motion to compel arbitration of a
removed state court action alleging that, inter alia, Uber misclassified its drivers as
independent contractors to avoid application of labor and employment laws). But see
Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., 893 F.3d 53, 64 (1st Cir. 2018) (denying a motion to
compel arbitration and refusing to enforce Uber's arbitration clause in its customer
contract). See generally Gross, Uberization, supra note 106, at 51-60 (gathering
cases).
111. This jurisprudence as applied to Uber drivers was recently thrown into doubt
by the Court's opinion in New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 536 (2019) (hold-
ing that drivers who are independent contractors for an interstate trucking company
are exempt from the FAA's application under Section 1's exclusion for "contracts of
employment of . . . workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce"). However,
even if the arbitration clauses in TNC contracts are not enforceable under federal law,
they might be enforceable under state law. Additionally, New Prime is not relevant to
arbitration clauses of Uber customers, just drivers.
112. The Razak court was able to address the issue of liability of the TNC precisely
because the plaintiffs there timely opted out of the arbitration clause. In addition, in
spring 2018, Lyft and Uber both announced that they will no longer enforce their
PDAA in lawsuits by passengers against the ride-sharing company for liability for
sexual assaults by drivers. See Laharee Chatterjee, Uber, Lyft Scrap Mandatory Arbi-
tration for Sexual Assault Claims, REUTERS (May 15, 2018), www.reuters.com/article/
us-uber-sexual-harassment-idUSKCN1IG12.
113. Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 899 (2007)
(recognizing that "the common law adapts to modern understanding and greater ex-
perience"). See generally BENJAMIN N. CARDOzO, THE NATURE OF THE JuICIAL PRO-
CEss (1921) (exploring the role of courts in the development of law).
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Like in the suitability claim context, a customer suing Uber will
have little guidance or precedent from a court as to the scope of liabil-
ity of a TNC to a passenger. Customers will be in the dark when ne-
gotiating settlements of these disputes. With far less information
available to guide a principles-based negotiation, the customer will
likely sacrifice a fuller recovery to avoid the costs and uncertainties of
proceeding in arbitration. Customers negotiating disputes with a
TNC will not be able to invoke bargaining endowments derived from
legal rules because of the murky shadow of the law governing TNC
liability. As a result, they will not derive the benefit of the bargaining
endowments that the law otherwise would have granted to
customers.
Similarly, the TNC may be risk-averse and thus may want to
settle an arbitration by paying out to a customer or driver more than
they otherwise would pay if the dispute were to proceed to court. Be-
cause the TNC cannot predict the outcome in arbitration, the TNC
will not be able to assess its bargaining endowments and thus will be
forced to give them up because of the nature of arbitration. Thus, re-
gardless of whether the disputant "forced" arbitration on the user-
here, the customer or the employee-the fact that an unsettled dis-
pute proceeds to arbitration instead of litigation results in a loss of a
party's ability to bargain effectively or establish rights through
bargaining.
VI. CONCLUSION
Disputants negotiating in the shadow of litigation can predict
with some certainty the likelihood of a particular outcome if the dis-
pute does not settle before trial, and thus maximize the value of any
power granted by a legal right when bargaining. Negotiated out-
comes are knowingly shaped by the parties to incorporate their in-
formed assessment as to the force of legal rules that a court would
otherwise apply absent a settlement.
In contrast, as this Article demonstrates, disputants who negoti-
ate in the shadow of arbitration are at a comparative disadvantage.
First, as discussed in Section IV, due to procedural differences be-
tween arbitration and litigation, disputants bargain with the knowl-
edge that any arbitration award resulting from a failed negotiation
would be private, not reasoned in writing, and final, and they would
have little ability to seek judicial review of the award. Second, in in-
dustries where virtually all contractual relationships are subject to
an arbitration clause, bargaining disputants cannot assess legal
norms that would apply in an adjudicative process, as those legal
210 [Vol. 24:185
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norms are undeveloped, frozen, or nonexistent. If disputants seeking
to settle can neither negotiate from an anchoring or principled pre-
mise, nor manage the risk of failing to settle, the value and power of
bargaining endowments they otherwise would have if the dispute
proceeded to trial declines precipitously. Disputants, regardless of
whether they have weak or strong economic bargaining power, lose
legal rights.
If all disputants, not just those with weaker positions in eco-
nomic relationships, know or even suspect that they have lost some
legal rights solely because arbitration, not litigation, is the endgame,
they will have another reason to perceive arbitration as unfair.1 14
Gross and Black note:
Subjective perceptions [of users of a dispute resolution process]
are important because participants' views of fairness, particu-
larly procedural fairness, are critical to the integrity of the dis-
pute resolution process . ... Simply put, even if the system
meets objective standards of fairness, a mandatory system that
is not perceived as doing so cannot maintain the confidence of
its users and, in the long run, may not be sustainable.Is'5
When disputants negotiate in the murky or even dark shadow of
arbitration and perceive the process as unfair-whether that percep-
tion is objectively accurate or not-commercial arbitration as an al-
ternative to court loses legitimacy and credibility. As one
proceduralist scholar recently observed, "Arbitration occurs not
merely in the shadow of formal adjudication; arbitrations occur under
the auspices of a formal system that must be held accountable."'' 6
How can we hold the system of arbitration accountable if it casts a
murky, dark shadow over disputants?' 7
114. See supra notes 7-16 and accompanying text (listing current critiques of the
fairness of commercial arbitration); see also Jill I. Gross & Barbara Black, When Per-
ception Changes Reality: An Empirical Study of Investors' Views of the Fairness of
Securities Arbitration, 2008 J. Disp. RESOL. 349, 395-97 (2008) (summarizing results
of survey of participants' perceptions of the fairness of securities arbitration and con-
cluding that investors' negative perceptions stem from, in part, the lack of trans-
parency in outcomes and investors' unrealistic expectations of the process)
[hereinafter Gross & Black, When Perception Changes].
115. Gross & Black, When Perception Changes, supra note 114, at 400; see also
Jean R. Stemlight, ADR Is Here: Preliminary Reflections on Where It Fits in a System
of Justice, 3 NEV. L.J. 289, 297-98 (2003) (stating that the "subjective perception of
fairness is critical, because even assuming objective fairness, the system could not
function well if it were perceived to be unfair or unjust").
116. Thomas 0. Main, Arbitration, What Is It Good for?, 18 NEV. L.J. 457, 475
(2018).
117. On the other hand, if arbitration is just part of the accepted trend toward
private procedural ordering, we may not care whether it is accountable. For further
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As a legal matter, the Supreme Court continues to enforce adhe-
sive arbitration agreements rigidly and refers to Congress litigants
who challenge the enforceability of an arbitration clause if they want
relief.118 However, as a practical matter, arbitration is under as-
sault. 119 The public's perception that arbitration is unfair under-
mines the legitimacy of the process and promotes a "flight from
arbitration." 1 2 0 In turn, weakening the legitimacy of arbitration con-
tradicts values of "process pluralism," 1 21 which promotes utilizing the
most appropriate dispute resolution process to enhance the delivery
of substantive and procedural justice. 122 Given all of the public pres-
sure already on "forced" arbitration to defend itself as a legitimate
alternative to court, the institution of arbitration may not be able to
withstand further criticism from users.
discussion of procedural private ordering, see Robin J. Effron, Ousted: The New Dy-
namics of Privatized Procedure and Judicial Discretion, 98 B.U. L. REV. 127, 128
(2018); Jaime Dodge, The Limits of Procedural Private Ordering, 97 VA. L. REV. 723,
725 (2011).
118. See Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 524, 528
(2019) (rejecting the judge-made "wholly groundless" exception to arbitrability under
the FAA and reminding parties that "we are not at liberty to rewrite the statute
passed by Congress and signed by the President"); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S.
Ct. 463, 468 (2015) (reminding Supreme Court of California that "[t]he Federal Arbi-
tration Act is a law of the United States, and Concepcion is an authoritative interpre-
tation of that Act. Consequently, the judges of every State must follow it"); Nitro-Lift
Techs., L.L.C. v. Howard, 568 U.S. 17, 21 (2012) (scolding the Oklahoma Supreme
Court that it "must abide by the FAA, which is 'the supreme Law of the Land,' and by
the opinions of this Court interpreting that law").
119. See supra notes 7-16 and accompanying text.
120. Gross, Justice Scalia's Hat Trick, supra note 35, at 116.
121. "Process pluralism" is an ideology that rejects legal centrism (the notion that
courts, law, and lawyers are the primary means of handling disputes) and favors a
multiplicity of dispute mechanisms. See John Lande, Getting the Faith: Why Business
Lawyers and Executives Believe in Mediation, 5 HARv. NEGOT. L. REv. 137, 147, 149
(2000) ("A key element of process pluralism is the belief in the legitimacy of a multi-
plicity of disputing mechanisms."); see also Kimberlee K Kovach & Lela P. Love,
Mapping Mediation: The Risks of Riskin's Grid, 3 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 71, 89 (1998)
("Maintaining the integrity of the alternatives to adjudication ensures 'process plural-
ism' in our dispute resolution system.").
122. See Jean R. Sternlight, Is Binding Arbitration a Form ofADR?: An Argument
That the Term "ADR" Has Begun to Outlive Its Usefulness, 2000 J. Disp. RESOL. 97,
107 (2000) (describing the evolution of the theory of "appropriate" rather than just
"alternative" dispute resolution and defining it as an "array" of dispute resolution
mechanisms that "are complementary to one another in the sense that they each have
their own strengths and weaknesses and are therefore appropriate in some situations,
and inappropriate in others").
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